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Indonesia: prospects of change

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INDONESIA : THE PROSPECTS OF CHANGE

In the fast pace of change of the world today, the occupation of making political or forecasts has become a very tricky business. News in the morning papers can already be invalidated in the evening. For the case of Indonesia, the attempts to analyze or describe future political changes has become more exciting. Not in the last place due to the political overhaul in Eastern Europe by the end of 1989. This presentation will try to give a forecast of changes in Indonesia up to March 1993, the period of the Indonesian presidential elections.

From junta to dictatorship

The Suharto government has over the years survived many crises, has changed policies and general strategy and in the end has remained as one of the oldest dictatorships on the globe today. In this quarter of century, 1965 to 1990 Suharto has proved himself to be a very skilful and cunning operator, willing to change policies if needed while at the same time sticking to certain principles.

In October 1965 a group of young middle-ranking officers kidnapped and killed six top army officers from the general staff. From this moment on Suharto's road to the Presidency was literally paved. The young officers called their movement the 30 September movement, usually known with the Indonesian acronym G30S. The next day Suharto and his troops crushed the small and badly organised G30S movement and at the same time emerged as the new army leader and saviour of the nation. The two other existing political powers the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party and President Sukarno were both badly discredited. The PKI was accused by the army of being the mastermind behind G30S (soon officially known as G30S/PKI)

while President Sukarno, according to the military, was informed about the of kidnap plans. On 1 October 1965 General Suharto virtually became the executive of Indonesia but it took two very long years before he was officially appointed as acting President. In this two years, with Sukarno as figurehead president, Suharto, with the backing of important sections within the armed forces, started with a vicious red drive. An estimate of one million alleged members of the PKI, the SOBSI (trade union), BTI (peasants union), Pemuda Rakyat (youth organisation) and Gerwani (Women's organisation) were killed while more than one million others were put in prisons and concentration camps. The purge of anybody with leftist inclinations or ideas and the constant vigilance (in general : the security approach) has become the first and most constant factor of the Suharto government. Another constant factor in Suharto's rule is the gradual centralisation of power into his hands; starting with a loose coalition with military fractions, the regime gradually transformed into a Suharto dictatorship. Over the years the structure of the Suharto rule has increasingly become a vertical top down structure. The third consistent factor is the depoliticisation of the Indonesian society.

Next to the constant factors, the Suharto rule can be described through features of change. One important factor of constant change is the relationship between Suharto and the ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces. Another important factor of change is the gradual emergence and growth of Indonesia as a corporatist state. And last but definitely not least is the swift and drastic changes in the economy. In this paper the constant and changing factors of the Suharto rule will be highlighted, but also seen in the context of historical change. Until 1974 Suharto could still rely on the support of the majority of ABRI, starting the mid seventies a period of uncertainty emerged as several important opposition groups

within ABRI started to challenge his leadership. Since 1983, Suharto's fourth presidential term, his rule became increasingly personalised. It could well be argued that Suharto in this period reached the peak of his power, at the same time recent history has taught that accumulation of power contains a grave danger. Being at the top of the pinnacle can only mean descendence or a abrupt fall.
This paper will end with an attempt to analyze the ongoing power struggle in Jakarta and the prospects of change in the early nineties. The present situation in East Timor will also be included in the analysis.

The red purge and the security approach

Ever since Suharto came into power, the extermination of the PKI and affiliate organisations has become a constant factor. The physical extermination of an estimate of one million innocent trade unionists and peasants served Suharto in a multipurpose way. Firstly he managed to get rid of the only social - political force that could challenge his military rule. At the same time it gave Suharto internationally wide acclaim in particular from the major western powers like USA and UK. The US was increasingly involved in the Vietnam war and could not afford another front in the south while the UK was relieved as it meant the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation was over. For external reasons Suharto has deliberately kept the communist menace alive in order to maintain and enhance the legitimacy of his regime. It is definitely true that the Suharto government has kept the issue of communist threat alive for domestic reasons, to justify the regime's entire apparatus of social and political control. With the fall of the Eastern European regimes, it would be increasingly difficult to use the weapon of anti-communism, but leading generals like General Sukarto has already given a new twist to the original version. General

Sukarto claims that traditional communist parties are no longer a threat but new, more sophisticated Marxist groupings will emerge. These groupings will be more difficult to trace, says the general, as they will use different issues like human rights, democracy and environmental issues.

The emergence of security and intelligence bodies

From the early start of the Suharto regime, a main focus was put towards intelligence and social control. A whole range of 'terror-institutes' were developed: *Kopkamtib* (now called *Bakorstanas*) was the first body to be created by the end of 1965. Kopkamtib, a military command for the restoration of law and order was specially assigned to track down alleged communists, organised purges in all the departments and other public entities like schools, hospitals etc. and organised mass arrests. Kopkamtib was also responsible for the erection of the many prison and concentration camps, not in the last place the prison island of Buru where tens of thousands innocent Indonesians had to stay for 10 years without any formal accusation or trial. From the outset Kopkamtib had an extra constitutional character, it meant that the body had virtually unlimited powers. It could randomly arrest persons without any legal procedure, ban public meetings, publications or showing of films. It blacklists people going in and out of the country and deals with all delicate matters in society like labour disputes and land conflicts. Very often Kopkamtib was described as 'a nation within a nation' as it was allowed to intrude into people's lifes, do interrogations, torture etc. The military officers involved in the leadership of Kopkamtib were always seen as the most powerful people in Indonesia. The first commander of Kopkamtib was General Suharto himself, who in total led the body for 8 years. Chief of Staff of Kopkamtib in the seventies was General Yoga Sugama, a notorious Japanese educated intelligence officer.

In an interview Yoga Sugama compares his work:

> *What I would like to say is this: the position given to me has never had any precedent in any country, not before. The only precedent was during Himmler's time and was given Himmler - only with a great difference - that Himmler is doing it subjectively, because he has the power to do that and he is a powerful man who can anything on earth, responsible to Hitler himself. While me, I am doing this and like to be responsible to the parliament and the government.*

General Benny Murdani combined positions in both Bakin (military intelligence) and Kopkamtib and has been Indonesia's second most powerful man in the last decade.

On 5 September 1988, Kopkamtib was dissolved and replaced by Bakorstanas, a body directly under the command of the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. Officially this new body does not possess any operational authority, it was meant like a 'watchdog' to monitor developments in society. In practice Bakorstanas functions exactly like its predecessor Kopkamtib. Arrests, interrogations and torture remain to be the responsibility of Bakorstanas.

Another intelligence outfit was *OPSUS (Operasi Chusus,* Special Operations), part of *Kostrad*, the reserve trocps command. Kostrad was the outfit under Suharto's command in 1965 that virtually brought him into power. From Opsus most of Suharto's aides originate from like General Ali Murtopo, General Sudjono Humardani, General Suryo and General Yoga Sugama. OPSUS became quite instrumental in stage managing the first general elections in 1969. OPSUS became the strategic body to steer and mould the *Golkar* into the political vehicle of the military. It also was responsible for the muzzling of the existing political parties. Moreover OPSUS was responsible for stage managing the so called referendum in West Papua in 1969 with the result that West Papua became part of Indonesia. In the early eighties, OPSUS quietly disappeared from the scene, it has proven its effectiveness for Suharto and

apparently was no longer needed.

Other bodies are the military intelligence bodies called *BAIS* and *BAKIN*. By virtue of being intelligence bodies, their tasks and division of labour is not very clear. While Kopkamtib/Bakorstanas and OPSUS were directly operational, the two intelligence bodies function in a more discrete way with nevertheless devastating results. The impact of Bakin (Bais is less used in the popular vocabulary) on both the civilian society and military is widely recognised. Caution and self censorship has almost become second nature for the average Indonesian citizen. The fear is very deep that anybody in the vicinity, even the next-door neighbour, can be a Bakin agent. This fear extend also into the military, soldiers in the same outfit or platoon dare not to raise open criticism as somebody in the platoon might be a Bakin informer. So far this intense fear has kept the country intact and an artificial unity among the people, but a political events can easily create a breakdown in this unity. With the fall of the Ceausescu regime, many political observers have made the logical comparison of the Securitate with Bakin and the quick crumble down of the repressive apparatus.

The use of provocation methods is maybe the most consistent feature in Indonesian politics. Practically all the major political conflicts in Indonesia are immersed with a strong element of provocation. Suharto's closest aides up to 1987 have been intelligence officers and it is a public secret that many allegedly subversive plots were deeply infiltrated by intelligence agents and subsequently provocated to perform unlawful acts. It could be argued that the Indonesian armed forces has a pitiful record as a pure military strike force but as an intelligence outfit is doing a very effective job. The territorial concept of the Indonesian army possesses a strong security component. Leaked documents from East Timor (the military manual) is a proof of population control.

Monitoring the internal enemy

The government has defined its political enemies as follows: the extreme left (is identical with communism) and extreme right (identical with political Muslim). Besides these two enemies, occasionally liberalism is also seen as a strange and alien ideology, but has never been put in the same category as communism or Muslim activism. Both groupings are seen as a subversive threat and the necessary measures are taken against it. The majority of prisoners of 1965 have been released but are kept under constant surveillance. All 1.4 million ex-prisoners must carry identity cards with the letters ET for *ex-tapol* (former political prisoner), marking them out for discriminatory treatment and enabling the authorities to keep track of their whereabouts and activities. Local administrations also subject all ex-prisoners to periodic re-registration and indoctrination. This system of discrimination does not only affect the ex-prisoner himself but continues to affect the children and even grandchildren. People who apply for jobs in the state sector have to prove that they are 'politically clean', meaning that there is no blood relative or relative by marriage involved in a subversive organisation. Twenty five years after the events, the control over this group of 1.4 million pariahs is still as severe as ever and periodically harassments are stepped up (people are summoned to appear at the local military garrison, interrogated etc.) to keep the constant atmosphere of fear going. Similar methods of repression are being applied towards radical Muslims. In the last 15 years thousands of Muslim activists have been harassed, arrested or even killed like in the tragic affairs of Tanjung Priok in 1984 and Lampung in 1989. In these two cases the military decided to use brutal force against protestors and in both incidents hundreds of innocent people were killed. The last fifteen years could also be characterised as the period of innumerable Muslim trials -

showcase trials with severe prison or even death sentences to put fear amidst the Muslim community.

The centralisation of power

The centralisation of power has always been at the top of priorities in any authoritarian government. Any dictator, including is obsessed by the idea, especially when their leadership is being challenged. Suharto came into power with the full support of main sections of the armed forces. The very first years of Suharto rule showed the complicity of trying to keep all the military factions pleased and satisfied. Already in the early seventies Suharto and his group had to deal with the challenge of a powerful army faction, usually called the New Order radicals. Suharto clipped the wings of the officers of this group and detached them to remote provincial posts. In 1974 another challenge emerged, General Sumitro (at that time ABRI vice-commander and Kopkamtib commander) started to show open defiance towards the Suharto group. The conflict was fought out in the streets of Jakarta and after a week of rioting, General Sumitro became totally discredited. Sumitro and his closest aides were removed from office.

By the end of the seventies most of Suharto's generation of officers (usually called the 1945 generation, the generation that fought for Indonesia's independence) were in disagreement with the Suharto group. Several futile attempts were made to push Suharto from the throne but every time Suharto managed to outwit his foes and came out stronger. In 1980 Suharto decided to banish the old style of leadership and revealed new plans to build up the state along clear corporatist lines. The shaky seventies, where everything was based on weak coalitions between military factions, was abandoned. The reorganisation of Golkar and ABRI became top priority for Suharto. A series of draft Laws were introduced, all part of

the overall plan to legalise the corporatist idea.
Golkar, the government party with a convenient majority, although already functioning as a political vehicle for Suharto was fundamentally overhauled. From a loose federation run by army factions, Golkar gradually was revamped into a well-oiled party machine, with a top bottom structure led by Suharto himself. General Sudharmono, at that time the State Secretary and a staunch Suharto loyalist, was appointed as Golkar chairman.

Important Laws were enacted in 1985. The Law on Social Organisations *(UU ORMAS, Undang-Undang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan)* obliges all organisations to adopt *Pancasila*, the state ideology, as the sole principle and to insert it in their constitutions. Moreover the law empowers the government to maintain an unprecedented level of control over non-governmental organisations. For example it empowers the government to suspend the board of an organisation, deliver guidelines and promoting of fusion of organisations into single umbrella organisations. Another law, Law on Political Parties and Golkar, also known as *azas tunggal* or sole principle, obliged the parties to adopt Pancasila as the sole principle. Through the introduction of this law, the last remnants of pluriformity was discarded and Indonesia adopted its own version of a single-party system. The Golkar, the government party with two third of the votes and the two party federations PDI and PPP merely with a decorative function.

Depoliticisation of the people

As a reaction the highly politicised period of President Sukarno, Suharto was determined to keep the politics low and has kept firm to this principle. From a high profile third world country, Indonesia became a mediocre country in the international arena. On the domestic front, as explained before, 'alien ideologies' like Marxism, political Islam and

liberalism were declared as subversive. Pancasila, already Indonesia's state ideology since 1945, in the Suharto period became a watchword for ideological conformity. Every citizen had to attend obligatory Pancasila courses. At schools 'Pancasila morality education' becomes a compulsory subject.

In 1971 the nine remaining political groupings were forced to fuse. The nationalist and Christian parties fused into *PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia)* while the four Muslim parties merged into a federation called *PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, United Development Party). The Government Party Golkar was not effected by the fusions. Since the establishment of the two federations, the military intelligence has not stopped to interfere and meddle. The party leadership had to be approved by the military and people with an independent mind were purged from active politics. Above this in 1975 the 'floating mass' theory was implemented, preventing the people living in the rural areas to become involved in poltics. The political parties were not allowed to campaign on subdistrict and village level and therefore party branches were prohibited. The argument was, still as valid as ever in 1990, that politics will create instability in the minds of the villagers and distract them from *Pembangunan*, the Development of the nation. This Pembangunan ideology putting economic growth on top along lines of ideological conformity, is the Indonesian version of corporatist thinking. Using the general definition of corporatism:

> *A sistim of representation in which every unit is arranged according to limited categories with a single character, compulsory, non-competitive, arranged in a hierarchic way and divided according to its function. These units are recognised, allowed or even set up by the state and given the monopoly of representation for each category with the restriction that they subdue and accept the control of the state.*

These kind of ideological conformity has been implemented forcefully by Suharto and in each category of the society: trade union, women's organisations, youth, peasants etc only a single entity is allowed to function. The government justifies this system by proclaiming that it prevents class struggle and creates harmony, conformity and cooperation. A familiar idea for those who have experienced the Caetano/Salazar period of dictatorship.

The drastic changes in the economy

The Indonesian economy is passing through hectic times. A series of government regulations have led to the liberalisation of the economy, necessitating a complete overhaul of the economy.

Foreign investors, with Japan, Hongkong, Taiwan and South Korea in the lead, have taken root in Indonesian soil. The Indonesian entrepreneurial class has benefitted hugely from the influx of foreign investments. In most cases, foreign investors have entered into joint ventures or other forms of collaboration with their local counterparts. Daily, the public is treated to press reports about new business ventures or long-established businesses "going public" by selling off millions of shares in the Jakarta and Surabaya stock exchanges. In less than a year, more than fifty new banks have been established, many of them off-shoots of business conglomerates.

While massive funds are swilling around to fuel the private sector, it is a well-known fact that the average annual income of US $500 ranks Indonesia as a low-income country. The Indonesian business weekly *Warta Ekonomi* has noted that Indonesia's wage labour is by far the cheapest in the region. A casual worker in Jakarta earns on average two thirds less than his colleague in Manila and a twentieth of the wage of a worker in Tokyo. Last November and December, there were

small outbursts of anger in several Javanese towns and cities in Java, directed mainly against Chinese-owned shops.

It is widely acknowledged that the most successful entrepreneurs are of Chinese origin. By far the largest are the business empires of Sudono Salim and William Suryajaya who together run more than 100 corporations, covering a wide range of activities. It is symptomatic of the hypocrisy of the regime that while Suharto has always relied heavily on the business acumen of the Chinese, his racist policies have persuaded most Chinese in Indonesia to adopt Indonesian names by deed of poll. Sudono Salim has been closely associated with Suharto since long before he seized power in 1965; their business relationship dates back to the early fifties, when Suharto was commander of the Central Java divisional command. The fortunes of William Suryajaya and his ASTRA concern took off when he became the sole agent of several Japanese corporations, among them Toyota. In 1974, during the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka, students demonstrated against Japanese economic domination by burning Toyota and ASTRA billboards and burning Japanese-made cars and motorbikes. A similarly explosive situation is present in Indonesia today; a single spark could well make people rush into the streets to take part in spontaneous rioting and looting of commercial and shopping centres.

The Suharto empire

Liberalisation of the economy has been forced upon Suharto by the World Bank and the foreign investors. Suharto has now consented to their demands for the economy to be opened up while making sure that his family enterprises can benefit from the changes. The so-called '*PPP corporations*' are now among the fastest growing business conglomerates. (PPP, the initials of one of the political parties, has been given a new meaning, 'putera-puteri president' or 'the sons and daughters of the

president'.) Many of the most attractive business deals automatically go to the PPP group; one recent example is the fiercely-contested tender between Japanese, American and Swedish electronic companies for the expansion of Indonesia's telephone central. While foreign companies had to compete, it has been announced that the victor will have to form a joint venture with either P.T. Nusamba (partly owned by Suharto's oldest son, Sigit) or P.T. Bimantara (owned by another of his sons, Bambang Trihatmodjo). Suharto's eldest daughter, Tutut has now emerged as a highly successful businesswoman who is constantly in the limelight. Her frequent appearance on TV and in the boulevard press grates on many people's nerves. The misdeeds of one or other of the Suharto family are the daily topic of conversation in Jakarta's middle class. At the same time, Suharto's close relationship with the Prasetya Mulia group of 31 conglomerates, of which Sudono Salim and ASTRA are the largest, has created the potential for social unrest. Prasetya Mulya is a business management institute set up a few years ago to provide management skills and trained personnel to companies which originated and expanded as family companies.

From conglomerate to cooperative

There are three types of businesses in the Indonesian economy, state-owned companies (BUMN), private companies and cooperatives. Like the BUMN, the cooperatives are state-led, state-owned or at least state-controlled. They are far removed from the bottom-up type of cooperative which took root in many western economies during the nineteenth century. The best example is the *KUD or Koperasi Unit Desa*; every village is required to create a KUD. In addition to being state-controlled, they are strongly militarised; the local military commander often holds sway over the KUD. At the centre, these cooperatives are under the supervision of the minister for

cooperatives, Major-General Bustanil Arifin who is the brother-in-law of the president; his wife is Mrs Suharto's younger sister. General Bustanil Arifin also heads *BULOG or Biro Logistik*, the state marketing agency which monopolises the purchase and sale of staple products like rice and other primary commodities. The top-down management of the village cooperative movement is typical of the corporatist concept of President Suharto, keeping every sector under the control of a single state body.

As the conglomerates have grown and the system of free enterprise has taken root, Suharto has been compelled to devise new schemes to steer developments away from potential conflict and unrest. At the executive, decision-making level, there has always been a tension between the technocrats' approach and the nationalist approach. The former prefer to allow the economy free range while the latter favour strong state intervention. Although Suharto has recently moved away from top-heavy state intervention to the more liberal approach, warnings from his closest aides have now caused him to swing in the other direction. In February, he called on conglomerates to hand over 25% of their shares to cooperatives.

Suharto has for years been very skilful at acquiring extra budgetary funds. In his autobiography, he dwelt at length with his various schemes to raise money through compulsory deductions from the salaries of civil servants or generous gifts from business tycoons. Billions of rupiahs have been syphoned off into a number of foundations and invested in banks. The interest alone is more than enough to finance numerous projects carrying the presidential tag; they include the erection of mosques, financing GOLKAR, the state party, or promoting so-called *INPRES* and *BANPRES* projects. These latter consist of small grants to the villages to fund anything from the purchase of a few milkcows or agricultural

tools and machinery to infra structural improvements like roads and bridges. By associating his office with projects that are funded by compulsory levies, Suharto has reaped a harvest of gratitude and sympathy from many rural Indonesians.

With his latest move to boost the cooperatives under the banner of redistributing the national wealth, Suharto has again won political acclaim. Even his political foes within the armed forces have had to welcome the initiative. In March, Suharto invited the richest tycoons in Indonesia who are part of the Prasetya Mulya Group. to his Tapos ranch. Thirty one entrepreneurs, most of them Chinese businessmen, attended the informal meeting and listened to Suharto's 'appeal' (in effect, an instruction) to divest holdings by selling shares to cooperatives. Suharto stressed the need to narrow the social gap and warned them of the possibility of social disorder. He made it clear that his move was prompted by political considerations and emphasised that the economic success of the few should now be channelled towards helping weaker economic groups.

However economically unsound Suharto's plan may be, it has certainly boosted his popular appeal. This is his response to warnings of the dire consequences of economic domination by Chinese-owned conglomerates which have come from military and Muslim circles. In the Tapos meeting the Prasetya Mulia group agreed to a gradualist scheme for selling the shares, starting with one percent. The President, standing at the head of the wealthiest family of all, made a generous gesture by divesting 10% of the shares of his foundations and 10% of the shares of the family's tea company, *Teh Nusamba* to cooperatives.

Many economists are doubtful about Suharto's scheme. It might be a clever political ploy to boost his popularity but, they argue, it poses the danger of creating a parasitic, high-cost economy. Indonesian cooperatives are known to be very

inefficient and bureaucratic. Large capital inflows are bound to strengthen these tendencies, bringing little benefit to the average worker. It is not visualised that the cooperatives receiving shares will begin to have a controlling interest in the companies; on the contrary, they are likely to sell off the shares at a profit. Moreover, there is a strong racial dimension to the Suharto initiative which could reinforce latent anti-Chinese feelings. Many small and medium-size Chinese businesses fear that the scheme will sooner or later be applied to them. Another fear is that capital flight will be seen as a way to avoid the divesting of shares.

Suharto's populist move has been launched at a time when there is growing evidence of severe strains between Suharto and the armed forces. Some argue that the share-out of funds will improve Suharto's standing among local military officers who stand to gain from the unexpected bonanza to be enjoyed by cooperatives controlled by local army chiefs. But far more important than this is the fact that the eye-catching move has boosted Suharto's political standing at a time when the succession issue is threatening to undermine his position. For the time being at least, the political initiative has moved in Suharto's favour, though speculations about the succession are bound to rumble on as the 1993 presidential elections loom larger on the horizon.

Suharto's relation with ABRI

From many recent events it has become apparent that Suharto's present relationship with the top of ABRI is at the very least troublesome. When General Suharto in 1965 took over the control from the civilian Sukarno he enjoyed the overwhelming support of the army officers. This is no longer the case and especialy after the last general elections in 1987, the Suharto increasingly strengthened the position of Golkar, the government party while ABRI's political influence

deteriorated. In the previous term, between 1982-1987, the balance of power between the bureaucrats/Golkar on one hand and ABRI on the other hand were evenly distributed. The exponent of the bureaucrats was Lt.General Sudharmono, at that time holding two important posts : chairman of Golkar and head of the State Secretariat (a kind of Prime Minister in a presidential cabinet) while General Benny Murdani held the crucial post of ABRI commander. It should be noted that many high placed army officers like Lt. Gen.Sudharmono, Maj. Gen.Ismael Saleh (Minister of Justice), Maj.Gen. Murdiono (the present State Secretary), Admiral Ginandjar (Minister of Energy) have not followed a career as field officers and therefore cannot be seen as people in the ABRI sphere of influence. ABRI generals are those who have enjoyed a conventional military career, either combat or intelligence or a combination of both. Animosity between these two groups have been consistent, but in the last five years this conflict has occasionally flared. When Sudharmono, much to the dismay of ABRI, was appointed as Vice-President, a nasty incident occurred. During the ceremony a Brigadier-General stood up and rushed to the mike, shouting and verbally showing his disagreement. Suharto's early kitchen cabinets consisted mainly of army officers but in the eighties Suharto has abandoned the idea of using a small core of advisers. His present loose group of advisers, are mostly civilians, bureaucrats, technocrats and businessmen.

The gradual estrangement

Suharto began his military career in Central Java and in the mid fifties he became the military commander of the Central Java military division. Like most of his army colleagues in the fifties, being an army local army commander meant a position like a warlord with a lot of power. The weak central command from Jakarta made the commanders behave like

local kings. It is precisely this tendency that Suharto wanted to avoid at all costs, when he became the ruler in Jakarta. Local commanders were assigned for the maximum of two years and weren't given the opportunity to develop a power base. Suharto demanded 100% loyalty from the military commanders and any sign of the build up of a power base was seen as a threat. A whole serie of ambitious generals: Sumitro, Widodo and Surono were replaced by more colourless officers. The present commander in chief General Try Sutrisno is a typical example of how Suharto likes his military commanders to be. He was Suharto's private aide in the seventies and his loyalty towards the president is unquestionable. At the same time Sutrisno is not in the position , if the opportunity occurs, to mobilise strategic sections of the military against the president. Originating from an army engineering unit, Sutrisno does not possess a power base like infantry, intelligence or special commando troops. In the seventies large sections of the military establishment fell out of grace and Suharto became increasingly convinced that ABRI support was not automatical any more. To keep his power he had to fortify and increase his base in Golkar, the bureaucracy and his alliance with the business class. The ABRI reorganisation of 1983 was carried out by two professional soldiers: General Benny Murdani and General Rudini. They carried out Suharto's objective to trim down the armed forces but above all to make the ABRI a well trained and professional army. These two officers had the advantage that they belong to the bridging generation: neither to the 1945 generation like Suharto or to AMN, the military academy generation. The reorganisation took more than two years and by 1985 the army leadership was rejuvenated. Two important elements coincided since 1985. Firstly by professionalising the ABRI, upgrading its defence and strike force abilities, ABRI's political domination in society gradually decreased. The new batch of military

leaders took more interest in more pure military affairs in contrast with the previous 1945 generation who has developed and implemented the *Dwifungsi* doctrine. This doctrine, the most important army doctrine affirms in essence ABRI's dual role as both a defence/security force but also as a social-political force. In 1982 the Dwifungsi doctrine received legal status when the rubber stamp parliament DPR adopted a new basic defence law. While Suharto's generation of officers took the dwifungsi as granted, the young batch of officers were more interested in the pursue of a military career. Many young officers look at the Dwifungsi in a mechanical way, i.e. fulfilling a post in the administration or local government and reject the idea of leaving the military to become part of the bureaucracy. Five years after the finalisation of the ABRI reorganisation it can be concluded that ABRI has lost much of its political influence. Suharto's new powerhouses, in particular the Golkar, the State Secretariat and the economic conglomerates have also directly or indirectly pushed ABRI's influence back. In Suharto's present views, ABRI's role in society should be more restricted; cynical enough, this was the demand of many army dissidents in the seventies. In this period the role of Dwifungsi was applied excessively and by 1977 over 21.000 ABRI personnel filled positions outside military functions. ABRI leaders argued that this trend made the armed forces weak as many cadres became administrators.

Some argue that at present Suharto is driving the military back to the barracks but it should be stressed that this tendency is only because of his growing power struggle with main sections of ABRI, in particular with Murdani and his group. It is expected that before 1993, the year of the presidential elections, some drastic changes will occur. It is also within the same expectations that ABRI will still play an important role in the developments.

The prospects of change

Although the presidential elections are still more than two years away, it was President Suharto himself who started the discussion of succession. In his highly controversial autobiography, published in 1989, Suharto indicated that this fifth term (1988-1993) will be his last one. In the meantime the discussion of Suharto leaving office or more general the fate of the New Order government, has escalated into a national issue. Strange enough, in contrast with other Asian countries where succession is prepared for a long time , Indonesia's preparation for succession seems to be totally absent. Suharto has not disclosed any viable candidate or concept about the transfer of leadership. Politicians still have to base their opinions on the remarks in his autobiography. In the last five years Suharto's way of channelling views has shifted quite substantially. It has become very rare that the president appears in a press conference or gives away public statements. Besides his written speeches in official festivities, Suharto very seldom makes unprepared statements. Nowadays his views are channelled through third persons. Ministers or other high placed persons, after official audiences with the president, will reveal the president's views to the outside world. Many leading politicians have tried by launching trial balloons about the succession but so far the president has kept his lips sealed. A few possible scenarios of change have been discussed in Jakarta none of them overall convincing, not in the last place due to lack of proper democratic structures and outlets. As argued earlier political forecasting has great risks and uncertainties. Scenarios based on deep knowledge regarding the power structures can also fail, proven in 1965 when the politically relatively low profile officer called Suharto emerged as the undisputed leader.

The most possible scenario is a relatively smooth takeover from Suharto by a group of generals. The most powerful group of officers are assembled around a triumvirate of General Benny Murdani, General Rudini and General Edi Sudradjat. In particular Murdani and Sudradjat enjoy a lot of support within the army, Murdani paved the way for the present generation to lead ABRI while Edi Sudradjat the present army chief-of-staff is seen as the representative and spokesperson of the present generation of officers. This group are very much contesting Suharto's leadership but their views on the succession are widely known. While they take it for granted that Suharto will step down in 1993, Murdani has reiterated on many occasions that the succession will be performed in a constitutional way. Chief of Staff General Sudradjat has backed Murdani's words by announcing the preparation of 422 military companies during this election period to keep the security and order. Murdani's constitutional concept is an implicit warning to Suharto to step down in a orderly way, albeit more forceful methods will be used. This scenario is better known in political circles in Jakarta as the 'Kopassus scenario', the red berets scenario. Kopassus is the notorious red berets commando that have played an instrumental role in 1965 during the red drive and in 1975 during the invasion of East Timor. All the three generals are former red berets and bear the same grudges against the excesses wealth and fortune of the Suharto family. Although in objective terms the Murdani group possesses enough muscle and fireworks, it is still to be seen whether they can mobilise enough support outside the armed forces. With the decline of the political fortunes of ABRI, their access to special funds also declined. Many of the military corporations have been closed down due to mis-management, corruption and incompetence while their connections with the large business groups is still far from satisfactory. There are strong indications that a group of

young officers is getting restless and want to step up the pace and create a showdown situation already prior to 1993. Murdani has been criticised strongly of not showing enough criticism and defiance towards Suharto. The option of showdown has been strongly rejected by Murdani, who wants a smooth succession along constitutional lines. As a long time Suharto loyalist, Murdani has shown enough caution and like nobody else recognises the cunningness and ruthlessness of Suharto. Regarding style of leadership, views or political culture Murdani shows many resemblances with Suharto. This is much less the case with Rudini and Edi Sudradjat who don't have a long enduring relationship with the president.

Many political observers will argue that Suharto will not resign voluntarily. Even if the three generals give the solemn guarantee that the vast wealth and property of the Suharto family will not be confiscated, experiences with the Marcos of the Philippines and Chun Do Hwan of South Korea , will make Suharto very cagey. The relatively good prospects of the economy will be beneficial for Suharto, if a kind of succession scenario is being implemented by the trio of generals. Although nearing his seventies, Suharto looks to be in good health and many observers are convinced that he will opt for at least another term. If this is going to happen it is expected that Suharto will make some manoeuvres to boost and regain his influence within ABRI. The most likely efforts will be to neutralise his opponents by appointing loyalists in the ABRI general staff. So far Suharto did not manage to interfere in the appointments at the top but promising lucrative offers to ABRI generals could easily jeopardise the plans of the three generals.

In both options, the smooth succession or a sixth term for Suharto, the position of the civilians, in particular the technocrats and the Muslim mainstream groupings, will gain importance. In the 'battle of wits', both Suharto and the

other side will give generous offers to these two important social groupings to get them on their side. Again, the president has the advantage to be able to offer more, either financial gains or positions in the administration.

The weak spots of Suharto

As explained earlier, Suharto's strength lies in the fact that he is able, if needed, to change policies. It does not mean that he doesn't have weak spots. On the domestic front, land conflicts have been very sluggish and has created instability on national scale. Although the handling of land affairs has now been transferred from the Department of Agriculture directly into the authority of the president's office, the conflicts has only grown in quantity and intensity. Several ABRI generals have shown open sympathies with the pledge of the peasants or demonstrating students. The presidency does not have an answer how to decrease the tensions. If exploited by the military, it can create an explosive situation. The other problem mentioned earlier is the equitable distribution of wealth. The fast pace of economic boom has not benefitted large sections of the urban poor. The problems of employment remain endemic while at the same time Suharto has to repay huge amounts of external debts.

Criticisms inside and outside Indonesia concerning violation of human rights, the aggression over East Timor and West Papua and environmental degradation, are consistently growing and parrying criticisms has become a major share for the Indonesian diplomats. The globalisation of the world and the increasing interdependency of nations cannot but affect Indonesia. A new generation of human rights and environmental activists have emerged on the Indonesian political scene, rejecting all the scenarios described above. They demand the uphold of human rights and the establishment of a democratic system. At the end this the only viable alternative.